ABSTRACT
Introduction
In this paper we explore for European Union (EU) and other OECD countries how fiscal policymakers set their plans and how they deviate from these plans in response to new information about the economy. We pay particular attention to the cyclicality of such fiscal policy corrections.
The split between plans and deviations from plans has hardly been investigated, but it is important, because discretionary corrections to the original plans in response to new information about the business cycle are potentially very costly. The private sector may have taken decisions on the basis of these plans and these decisions may be costly to change.
We analyze fiscal policy in two steps. First, we regress ex ante (i.e., forecast or projected) fiscal stances on the output gap forecast and a number of plausible control variables. In our second step, we explore how fiscal policy deviates from the original plan to respond to new information about the output gap and other variables. At this stage, we face two complications. One is that changes in the output gap may be endogenous to the changes in the fiscal stance. The second complication is that the way the data are constructed may change over time. This would introduce measurement error into our regression model. We address these complications in a variety of ways. All alternative strategies yield similar outcomes.
We find substantial differences between planned fiscal behavior and responses to new information about the economy, both between the EU countries and the other OECD countries. Ex ante fiscal policy is a-cyclical for the EU countries and counter-cyclical for the non-EU countries.
However, the response of this latter group to new business cycle information is a-cyclical. By contrast, the EU countries react in a procyclical way to new information about the output gap.
Further investigation suggests that this finding should be attributed to discretionary fiscal contractions in response to an unexpected deterioration of the business cycle. Additionally, for the EU countries the planned fiscal stance is more relaxed for election years, while a projected violation of the EU deficit restrictions imposed on these countries induces a tightening in the ex ante fiscal stance.
Our paper connects in several ways to the existing literature. A substantial number of recent contributions have estimated fiscal rules for the EU or the OECD. The results are sometimes conflicting (see Golinelli and Momigliano, 2008 , for a recent overview), but quite a few articles find that fiscal policy has behaved pro-cyclically during at least part of their sample period. For example, Galí and Perotti (2003) , Wyplosz (2006) and Annett (2006) find for the Euro-zone that fiscal policy has behaved pro-cyclically before the Maastricht Treaty was signed, and a-cyclically after that. Lane (2003) , Balassone and Francese (2004) and Debrun and Kumar (2007) find for a set of OECD countries that fiscal policies have (on average) been pro-cyclical.
These articles all use ex-post (i.e. revised) data. However, an increasing number of authors argue that ex ante or "real-time" data may be more informative about the behavior of the fiscal authorities, because these data are available at the moment a fiscal plan is constructed. By using revised data, which often differ substantially from the ex-ante data, one violates the requirement of explaining fiscal behavior by using only variables that are known when the plan is constructed.
Several papers now use ex ante data for assessing the behavior of fiscal authorities, including Forni and Momigliano (2004) , Golinelli and Momigliano (2007) , Cimadomo (2007) and Giuliodori and Beetsma (2007) . However, closest in spirit to this paper are Brück and Stephan (2006) and Pina and Venes (2007) . Both papers are interested in the political determinants of forecast errors in fiscal policy, thereby controlling for economic variables. In contrast to this paper, they do not cyclically adjust fiscal policy. Moreover, they do not split between EU and non-EU countries. Finally, their direct data sources and sample periods are different. Brück and Stephan (2006) use fiscal forecasts published by the European Commission. Pina and Venes (2007) base their analysis on the budgetary notifications in the context of the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP). Other authors (Strauch, et al, 2004 , Moulin and Wierts, 2006 , and Annett, 2006 use the projections in the EU Stability and Convergence Programmes (SCPs).
Estimation based on ex ante data is not free from criticism either. The eventual sources of the ex ante data are usually the national statistical offices. To the extent that these offices are under the influence of politicians, they may be put under pressure to modify their data. The Treasury uses these data to construct economic and budgetary projections and possible political biases (such as an overly optimistic forecast of potential output) may sneak in.
1 To limit the potential influence of such bias on the results, we use data from the OECD, as do many other contributions, including Galí and Perotti (2003) and Lane (2003) . The OECD applies its own judgment to the plausibility of the projections it receives and it includes only those fiscal measures that have been legally enacted by the time the forecast is made. Nevertheless, the eventual OECD projections become available only after consultation rounds with the national authorities. Hence, there would still be room for 1 Here, "political bias" refers to the incentive of the government to publish a plan that differs from the true plan that it has in its mind. This true, unreported plan and the eventual policy outcomes may of course also be driven by political considerations.
possible political bias. However, OECD data are the best we can use in this regard. 2 Even so, we check that there are no systematic biases in our data.
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The use of OECD data has several additional advantages. First, the definitions and methodologies used to construct the variables are comparable across countries. Second, OECD data are published in December. This is later in the year than the forecasts in alternative datasets (such as the EDP notifications), which makes it more likely that the OECD forecasts are indeed based on the definitive plans approved by the national parliaments. 4 Finally, OECD data allow for the use of a larger country sample and include directly the cyclically adjusted fiscal measures.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and notation.
Section 3 analyses ex-ante fiscal policy. Similarly, Section 4 investigates fiscal policy responses to new information about the economy. Section 5 concludes this paper and draws some policy implications.
The data and notation
All data (except those on population composition and election years, which are from the Comparative Political Dataset, 2007) are from the various December issues of the OECD Economic Outlook (EO). Each issue of the EO contains "forecasts" of variables for next year, "estimates" of variables for the current year and revised values of variables over the preceding years ("revised data"). We shall refer to the estimates for the current year as "first-release data". These data capture most accurately the information set available to the fiscal policymakers at the moment they take decisions to revise their policy in deviation from their original plan. Hence, "first-release data" are most suited for our purposes. Revised data often contain information that was not available at the moment when policy decisions were taken.
Another disadvantage of using revised data is that the methodology for constructing the data changes over time. This reduces the comparability of the revised and originally planned figures. For example, at some point the national statistical offices or the OECD may decide to include (or exclude) certain components in the calculation of the deficit or they may update previous estimates of tax elasticities, etcera. One could view these methodological updates as random shocks independent of the shocks that hit the economy. The larger the time difference between the original 2 Using OECD data is preferable to using IMF or European Commission data, because the OECD is not involved in formal policy decisions, unlike the other two institutions. 3 A number of recent papers assess the potential presence of biases in economic and budgetary forecasts (see, for example, Strauch et al., 2004 , Jonung and Larch, 2006 , and Pina and Venes, 2007 , for the European countries). 4 This is not the case for all countries, because for some of them the fiscal year differs from the calendar year.
plan for a year and the revised figure for that year, the larger is the variance of the accumulated methodological shock.
Our dataset consists of a panel. 
Ex-ante behavior
The baseline specification for ex-ante fiscal behavior is:
where c i is a country-specific constant, θ t is a year-specific constant (a time fixed effect), DEF and Y, respectively, denote the cyclically-adjusted primary deficit as a share of GDP and the output gap (defined as the deviation of actual from potential GDP, as a share of the latter). Finally, x it is a set of control variables. For the baseline specification, x it contains 1 , 1 t i t DEBT − − , the debt/GDP ratio, because more indebtedness may lead to more concern about fiscal sustainability and induce governments to contract fiscal policy (as found by Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay, 2003, and Favero, 2003 ELECT , then we would expect the effect to become only stronger if we were to use a proxy that actually is in the information set of the policymaker at the moment he draws up his plan.
The baseline regression includes country-specific constants to capture country-specific effects as well as systematic misrepresentation in the forecasts to the extent that this is constant over time (for example, there may be specific time-invariant political incentives to exaggerate potential output). The baseline regression also includes time fixed effects. These are intended to capture common third factors driving all fiscal stances, interdependence in fiscal stances that is unlinked to common economic circumstances (for example, due to mutual peer pressures of countries on each other's fiscal policies -see Giuliodori and Beetsma, 2007) and common changes in the methodology of data construction. We estimate equation (1) 1997 (for Greece, τ ≥ 1999 and i is currently in the Euro-area; and 0 i SG P τ τ ≡ , otherwise. Beetsma and Debrun (2007) provide a recent discussion of the SGP. 6 Realizations of NONACTIVE it for 2006 are based on interpolation from preceding observations. 7 Obviously, while we focus on the response of the ex ante fiscal stance to the ex ante output gap, with the inclusion of time dummies we will fail to capture that part of the response that is due to a common reaction to global ex ante output gap movements. However, econometric testing strongly favours the inclusion of time dummies as a prerequisite for an appropriate econometric specification. In fact, some further investigation suggests that the common response to global ex ante output gap movements is only of minor importance. the explanatory power is provided by the estimated stance for the preceding year, (2004) for realised data. Finally, the variables capturing the violation of the Maastricht and SGP 3% limit on the deficit are highly significant, indicating that, at least in their ex ante behavior, the fiscal authorities react with a fiscal tightening in the case of such a violation.
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We estimate the baseline specification also for subgroups of countries. In particular, we split the country sample into EU countries and non-EU countries. If we restrict ourselves to the EU-14, the regression outcomes remain qualitatively unaltered, except that the output gap is no longer significant. Hence, the counter-cyclicality that was found for the full sample must be due to the remaining OECD countries. Indeed, for the non-EU sub-sample the output gap is significantly negative and more than twice as large than for the full sample. Significance is weaker though than for the full sample, possibly because of the smaller number of observations. Probably for the same reason the election dummy, while still entering with a coefficient of the "right" sign, is no longer significant.
We are also interested in seeing whether the fiscal authorities react differently to forecasts of negative versus positive output gaps. Therefore, we define two new variables Table 2 . Estimation for the full sample suggests countercyclical planning when the output gap forecast is positive and a-cyclical planning when it is negative. This is consistent with the findings of Cimadomo (2007), who uses the same sample, but a slightly different specification. If we split the country-sample into EU and non-EU countries, none of the estimates of the coefficients on the output gap forecasts remain significant. The coefficient of
is negative and quite close to significance for the non-EU subsample, suggesting that the number of degrees of freedom has become too low to formally test for counter-cyclicality at conventional confidence levels.
A potential objection to our approach of estimating ex ante fiscal policy could be that the forecasts of the cyclically adjusted primary deficit or the output gap are systematically biased for some (maybe political) reason (e.g., Brück and Stephan, 2006, and Pina and Venes, 2007) . If such a bias were constant at the country level, because governments actually plan a cyclically adjusted primary deficit that exceeds its reported forecast by a fixed amount, we would expect it to feed into the estimate of the country-fixed effect. Because the OECD processes the data, this might reduce the bias. After all, the OECD applies its own judgment to the plausibility of the forecasts.
Nevertheless, we can check whether there is indeed such a bias by testing statistically whether the reported forecasts deviate from the corresponding first release observations. We also check whether the data from the last available release deviate in a systematic way from the reported forecasts.
However, as argued above, first-release observations are best able to capture the real time fiscal response to real time changes in the information set. A potential complication is that changes in the data construction methodology between the moments of publication of a forecast and its realization may undermine the validity of the test. Given that for first release data these moments are just one year apart, the effect of potential changes in methodology should be limited.
In order to address the importance of potential systematic projection biases and methodological changes, we first define 
Y ) is the primary cyclically adjusted deficit (output gap) for year t published in the latest vintage of the OECD Economic Outlook. Table 3 reports for each country the means over time of the forecast errors (and their statistical significance). It is interesting to notice that the means of the errors based on the first-release data are only statistically significant in one instance, indicating that there does not seem to be evidence of a systematic bias into one direction. This suggests that systematic biases of the type discussed above play little or no role. However, the means of
− are in many instances significant.
One (indirect) way to address the potential problem of methodological changes is to regress forecast errors on their "lags". In particular, for the first-release data we regress
, and for the final release data we regress
We perform similar regressions for the cyclically adjusted primary deficit. if we leave out the country-fixed effects (as is econometrically favoured -see Table 4 , column 2)
and it disappears entirely when we split the country sample into EU and non-EU countries (not reported here). As regards to the final release data, we observe that 
Fiscal responses to new information
Having analysed ex ante fiscal policy we shall now turn to the real-time responses of fiscal policy to economic developments that take place after ex ante policy has been formed.
We start our analysis of deviations (or "updates") from plans with the following regression:
Hence, the left-hand side is the "update" of the fiscal stance, while the right-hand side contains the "update" 
DEF
− is included on the basis of earlier experimentation with the specification and controls for the potential inefficiency of the forecasts made in period t-1. Its significance indicates that these forecasts have not exploited all available information at the time they were made.
Again, we present the results for the full set of countries and for the two sub-samples of EU and non-EU countries. are highly correlated. The electoral dummies are no longer significant, suggesting that they play a greater role in ex ante fiscal policy than in the policy update. Finally, also the updates of the Maastricht and the SGP variables are insignificant.
We have re-estimated all three variants excluding the country-fixed effects. In a dynamic panel, including those fixed effects could bias the results. Although strictly speaking we do not 10 We define 
D IRLW
− are financial variables, they should be relatively free from methodological complications. Table 6 insignificant for the other group (column 3). Now, however, it is no longer significant for the full country sample (column 1). We have also redone the IV estimations dropping the country fixed effects. For the sake of space, we only report these estimates in Table A .1 of the Additional Appendix (not for publication). The output gap update remains insignificant for the full country sample, while it is again significantly positive (with roughly the same coefficient as before) for the EU sub-sample. Quite interestingly, its negative coefficient for the non-EU sub-sample now becomes significant, suggesting that for these countries fiscal stances have responded countercyclically to the output gap updates.
A limitation of using instrumental variables is that one needs to find suitable instruments.
Some experimenting showed that by far the most important instrument for differs from zero, then this may not only capture methodological updating, but it could also be the result of new information on the business cycle in period t-1 becoming available only with a lag. Table 7 reports the estimates of equation (3) is highly significant with a coefficient of 0.67. If we split the country sample into EU and non-EU countries, the outcomes for the two groups are very different.
For the EU countries the coefficient increases to 0.82 and remains highly significant, while for the non-EU group it drops to 0.19 and it loses its significance.
For the second stage we estimate:
11 By including time dummies we implicitly account for all country-invariant common factors that drive the instrumented variables. Therefore, it is not surprising that the role of the instruments on the fiscal reaction to this piece of new information. However, this is the price we have to pay for eliminating, or at least reducing, the impact of methodology changes on our estimates. Table 8 shows the results of the estimation of (4). The residual of (3), RESY it , enters with a significantly positive coefficient in the full country sample and, after splitting the sample, it also enters with a significantly positive coefficient for the EU countries, but it is insignificant for the non-EU countries. These findings are in line with our earlier result that fiscal policy updates in the former group behave pro-cyclically, while there is no cyclical effect in the fiscal policy updates of the latter group. Now, however, we only measure the pro-cyclical fiscal response to new information about the economy in period t.
As a final alternative, we use data from the June versions of the Economic Outlook. We run the following OLS regression analogous to (2) and (4) 
D Y
− − is the difference between the June period t estimate of the output gap in period t and the December period t-1 forecast for the output gap in period t. The advantage of this specification is that we can expect this regression to be less vulnerable to both potential endogeneity and methodological updating problems. If the feedback from an update of the fiscal stance onto the output gap takes at least half a year, any potential endogeneity vanishes completely. Table 9 shows the estimates for our three (sub-) samples. Variable 
_ t t it D Y
− in (2).
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As in the case of ex ante policy, we are interested in seeing whether the fiscal authorities react differently to negative versus positive output gap updates. We explore the effects of this split only for our most preferred regressions, which are the IV regressions that we reported in Table 7 and the June regressions in Table 9 . For the IV estimates we define the following two new variables Table 10 presents the new results, which are qualitatively the same for the IV and June estimates. In both cases the EU countries exhibit is a significant pro-cyclical reaction to negative output gap updates and an acyclical reaction to positive output gap updates. This finding corresponds to the rather common perception that the EU countries undertake too little effort to exert discipline in good times, which forces them to contract fiscal policy in bad times. For the non-EU countries, responses to both positive and negative output gap updates are a-cyclical. Of course, these findings may also be an indication of insufficient observations when the output gaps are split.
Concluding remarks and policy implications
In this paper we have used a new approach to analysing fiscal policy behavior. We have split the analysis of fiscal policy into an analysis of ex ante ("planned") fiscal policy and an analysis of deviations from ex ante policy in response to new information becoming available since ex ante policies were determined. We employed various alternative strategies to deal with the potential 12 As a robustness check, we included (one at a time) some additional controls to this regression. One was a dummy to distinguish between "delegation" versus "commitment" forms of fiscal governance (see Hallerberg, 2004, and Annett, 2006) . Under the former, the Finance Minister has a leading role in the budgeting process. The latter form of governance is characterised by a fiscal contract between government parties involving strict budget targets. Two further controls, from the Comparative Political Dataset (2007), measure the cabinet composition on a left-to-right scale, respectively the strength of the government in parliament. None of the three controls came out significantly, nor did their inclusion affect the estimates of the coefficients of the other variables. This contrasts with Brück and Stephan (2006) and Pina and Venes (2007) , who find a greater role for political variables, although for revisions in cyclically unadjusted fiscal balances. We also included the update of the short-run interest rate to control for unexpected changes in monetary policy and we included an index of national fiscal rules (generously provided by Alessandro Turrini -see Debrun et al., 2008) both alone and interacted with the output gap update. Also, none of these additional controls came out significantly, nor did they affect the estimates of the other variables. endogeneity of the explanatory variables as well as potential methodology changes between different vintages of the OECD data.
We find that ex ante fiscal policy in response to output gap forecasts is acyclical for the EU countries, but counter-cyclical for the non-EU countries. Moreover, for the EU sub-sample the ex ante fiscal stance is relaxed for election years and tightened in response to violations of the Maastricht and SGP reference deficit levels. As regards to the deviations from ex ante policy, for the EU we find that fiscal policy reacts in a pro-cyclical way to new information about the business cycle. No such cyclicality is found for the non-EU sub-sample. Further investigation suggests that the cyclicality for the EU sub-sample arises from a pro-cyclical response to a worsening of the business cycle, while an improvement in the business cycle does not lead to any systematic fiscal reaction. This corresponds to the rather common observation that EU governments generally fail to tighten fiscal policy during good times, which forces them into contraction when the business cycle deteriorates. Finally, in going from ex ante to deviations from ex ante, the election dummy and the Maastricht and SGP variables all lose their significance.
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